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Impacts of Policy Measures on the Development of State-Owned Forests 
in Northeastern China: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence 
Xuemei Jiang, Peichen Gong, Göran Bostedt, and Jintao Xu 
  Abstract 
State-owned forest enterprises (SOFEs) in northeast China and Inner Mongolia play important roles 
both in timber production and in the maintenance of ecological security. However, since the late 1970s, forest 
resource and economic crises have seriously restricted these functions. Based on a theoretical and an empirical 
analysis of the harvest and investment behavior of the SOFEs, we examined the effects of forest policies and the 
socioeconomic conditions on the behavioral choices of the SOFEs. Both the extent to which SOFE supervising 
authorities emphasized improvement of forest resources in their annual evaluations and the increases in 
expenses necessary to manage SOFEs had significant impacts on harvest and investment decisions as well as 
development of forest resources. Promoting the management and utilization of non-timber resources, as well as 
reforms to increase the efficiency of forest protection and management, have reduced timber harvests as 
intended, which in turn has increased investment and improved forest resources. The effects have been relatively 
small, however. In contrast, reforms aimed at timber harvest and afforestation activities actually contributed to 
increasing the timber harvest, which affected the development of the forest resources negatively.  
  Key Words:  state-owned forest enterprise, ―double crises,‖ sustainable forest management, 
forest policy  
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Impacts of Policy Measures on the Development of State-Owned 
Forests in Northeastern China: Theoretical Results and Empirical 
Evidence 
Xuemei Jiang, Peichen Gong, Göran Bostedt, and Jintao Xu 
Introduction 
Most of the state-owned forest enterprises (SOFEs) in northeast China (Heilongjiang and 
Jilin Provinces, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) were established in the early 1950s, 
shortly after the People’s Republic of China was founded. Initially, the primary task of the 
SOFEs was logging (SFA 1987). In the 1950s and 1960s, the forests provided large quantities of 
much needed timber for the construction and development of the Chinese economy, but few 
efforts were devoted to forest regeneration and management. As a result, large harvested areas 
were not replanted. Although investment in afforestation and silviculture increased gradually 
after the late 1960s (table 1), it did not keep up with the extensive harvesting. In the late 1970s, 
the so-called ―double crises‖ began to emerge in the SOFEs, characterized by the rapid depletion 
of forestland suitable for harvesting and the increasing difficulties of the SOFEs to produce 
sufficient income to cover necessary expenditures (Zhang 1998).  
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Table 1. China Forestry Investment (in million yuans) 








1950–1952  81.99  0  81.99   
1953–1957  768.97  125.00  643.98   
1958–1962  2,516.52  477.09  2,039.43   
1963–1965  2,256.8  612.80  1,644.01   
1966–1970  3,056.81  835.79  2,221.01   
1971–1975  4,578.21  1,329.91  3,248.30   
1976–1980  4678.28  2,016.62  2661.65   
Source: SFA (State Forestry Administration), 1987. China Compendium of Forestry Statistics 1949–
1987 (Beijing:  China Forestry Press), 542–43. 
Since the late 1970s, a number of policy adjustments have been made to ease the pressure 
on the SOFEs. In 1978, a reform gave the SOFE managers more leeway to make decisions and 
increased their share of the profits (Zhang 1998), but the supervising authorities still retained 
tight control. These authorities approved all production plans and assessed the achievements of 
the SOFEs.  
In 1988 the supervising authorities started to implement a ―contract management-
responsibility system‖ to help reduce some of the operating costs of the SOFEs, but it 
unfortunately also increased exploitation of the forests in the region (Cao 2000). The reforms 
since 1992 have focused on introducing market mechanisms to the management of state-owned 
forests (SFA 2010). One of the strategies was to create market-oriented ―modern forest 
enterprises.‖ To this end, four large-scale forest companies were established in northeast China 
and Inner Mongolia between 1992 and 1996.  
For a long time after the reforms started, the SOFEs were obligated to sell part of their 
timber to the state at prices pre-determined by the government. In 1986 and 1990, the 
government adjusted its purchase prices for timber and increased the share of timber that the 
SOFEs were allowed to sell at market prices. Although the tax burden of the SOFEs had declined 
since the 1980s, the effects of the taxation relief only partly offset the continuously increasing 
fees that the SOFEs had to pay (Jiang 2006).  
It is worth mentioning that the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP), one of the key 
national forestry programs, has had a considerable impact on the SOFEs in northeast China and 
Inner Mongolia. The NFPP was started in 1998 and has substantially reduced the amount of Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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forestland managed for timber production. On the other hand, in the course of implementing the 
NFPP, the government significantly increased its financial support of the SOFEs and passed 
several reforms to increase the efficiency of forest resource management and protection by the 
SOFEs (SFA 2010). 
The forest coverage of the land area managed by the SOFEs increased from 79 percent in 
1980 to 90 percent in 2008. However, the proportion of forests managed for timber production 
fell from 92 percent in 1980 to 33 percent in 2008 (table 2). The most significant reduction in the 
share of timber production forests occurred in the late 1990s as part of the NFPP. Furthermore, 
the growing stock of timber in mature forests decreased from 71 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 
2008 of the total timber stock in the timber production forests (table 3). Significant reduction of 
the amount of timber in mature forests that could be harvested severely affected the sustainability 
of forest management. When the SOFE survey (reported below) was conducted, leaders of many 
of the enterprises admitted that current harvest levels could not be sustained for long.  
Table 2. Area of the Different Types of Forests in Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces and 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 




1980  92.00  4.57  0.13  6.15 
1985  93.08  5.12  0.05  2.25 
1990  91.81  5.57  0.32  2.59 
1995  92.23  5.46  0.42  2.28 
1997  92.62  5.27  0.24  2.11 
2000  87.65  9.72  0.00  2.63 
2004  56.55  34.84  0.00  8.62 
2008  33.44  56.07  0.00  0.00 
 
Table 3. Proportion of Mature Timber Stock in Timber Forests (percentage) 
Year  Heilongjiang 




1980  65.64  75.27  71.75 
1985  47.88  53.63  52.83 
1990  16.74  37.43  38.66 
1995  10.23  37.39  33.91 Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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1997  8.12  28.21  32.60 
2000  3.66  32.40  28.97 
2004  3.15  32.60  24.89 
2008  3.24  32.60  24.89 
 
Despite this, timber production remained the main source of income for the SOFEs. In 
2004, even though the harvest level was too high (relative to the available resource), about one-
third of the SOFEs lost money. At the household level, poverty was, and is, sometimes appalling 
among the SOFE workers. The average household annual income in 2004 was only 3,500 yuans, 
while the per capita dispensable income of urban residents was 9,422 yuans (Xu et al. 2006). 
A fundamental cause of the ―double crises‖ in both forest resource and profitability is the 
extensive harvesting and inadequate investment in regeneration and forest management that has 
occurred since the 1950s. To reverse this unsustainable situation with appropriate reforms, we 
need to analyze the factors that affect the SOFE’s timber harvest and investment behavior, 
starting with their decisionmaking behavior. 
When SOFE managers make decisions, they must consider both their own interests and 
the goals assigned by the supervising authorities. At present, they sign annual contracts with the 
supervising authorities, which specify both economic and forest resource targets. Obviously, one 
year is much too short, relative to the production cycle of timber, to allow the SOFEs leaders to 
make reasonable long-term sustainable management plans. The priority is the economic targets 
specified in the contracts because achieving these targets dominates the supervising authorities’ 
evaluation of the SOFEs.  
The annual assessment of the SOFEs, financial subsidies, and various regulations are the 
main instruments used by the forestry authorities to control and manage the SOFEs. It seems 
obvious that the supervising authorities would maximize social welfare and adopt policies and 
assessment criteria that sufficiently spur SOFE leaders to manage their forests sustainably. 
However, serious information asymmetry exists between the SOFEs and the supervising 
authorities, partly due to the large area managed by each SOFE (Xu and Ran 2004).1 This 
information asymmetry leads forestry authorities to focus more on the short-term economic 
performance of the SOFEs, which is easier to evaluate and is more closely related to the forestry 
                                                 
1 The average area managed by each SOFE is about 200,000 hectares. Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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authorities’ self interests. Consequently, the SOFEs often sacrifice safeguarding forest resources 
because sale of timber is the main source of income in pursuing profit targets.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the factors influencing the timber harvest, forest 
management investment behavior, and the forest resource change of SOFEs. The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a theoretical analysis of the behavior of 
SOFEs. Sections 2–4 describe the model specification, our survey data, and the results of the 
empirical analysis, respectively. The fifth section outlines the conclusions. 
1. Theoretical Analysis of the Behavior of State-Owned Forest Enterprises  
Timber harvest and forest management decisions at the SOFE level are made annually. 
The decisionmakers at typical SOFEs are concerned with two attributes of the outcome of their 
decisions:  the financial result in the current year and the state of the forest at the end of the year. 
The financial result of a SOFE is determined by the profits from timber production and forest 
management, the profits from non-forestry activities (including subsidies from the government), 
and the SOFE’s fixed costs.  
The last two components are treated as exogenous variables in the following analysis. 
Forestry profits refer to the revenue of timber harvest net of the harvest cost and costs of forest 
management activities. We assume that forest regeneration takes place immediately after an area 
of forest is harvested. Thus, regeneration cost is modeled as a function of the harvest volume.  
The cost of all other forest management activities is represented by a separate decision 
variable. The state of the forest is described by the growing stock of timber. The preferences of 
the decisionmaker are described using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The decision problem is 
modeled as:  
12
11 ,
max ( , ) [ ( , ) ] [ ( , )] fn hI
U Q h I c Q h I
       ,   (1a) 
subject to: 
( , ) ( , ) fh h I ph C r h I     (1b) 
10 ( , ) ( ) ( , ) m Q h I g Q h S r I  (1c) 
0 0 Q h   (1d) 
0  I (1e) Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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where h = total volume of timber to be harvested; 
p = timber price;  
I = total investment in forest management activities (excluding harvest and regeneration 
costs); 
( , ) f hI  = forestry profit; 
n  = non-forestry income; 
c = fixed costs; 
12 ,  = utility function coefficients; 
) , ( h r C h = the sum of harvest and regeneration costs;  
Q0 = the growing stock of timber at the beginning of the year; 
Q1 = the growing stock of timber at the end of the year; 
) ( 0 h Q g  = the potential timber growth;  
) , ( I r S m = the rate of realized timber growth; 
h r = productivity of timber harvest and regeneration efforts; and  
m r = productivity of forest management efforts. 
Large portions of the forests in northeast China are middle-aged or young stands. The 
SOFEs in this region own very few old-growth forests. Timber harvest commonly starts in the 
oldest and most easily accessible stands, where trees are larger and the stocking level is higher 
than in younger stands. As the harvest volume increases, younger and younger stands are 
harvested, implying that both the marginal harvest cost and the marginal regeneration cost 
associated with each harvested cubic meter of timber increase with the harvest volume. In profit 
function (1b), we capture these effects by assuming that  ) , ( h r C h  is an increasing and strictly 
convex function of the harvest volume h, namely,  0 ) , (  h r C h h and 0 ) , (  h r C h h h .  
The productivity of timber harvest and regeneration efforts  h r is included in the cost 
function  ) , ( h r C h  to reflect the effect of rationalization of timber harvest and regeneration 
operations on the cost of the operation. This variable is defined in such a way that, given an 
arbitrary harvest volume, a larger value of  h r  leads to a lower harvest and regeneration cost, in 
other words,  0 ) , (  h r C h rh . Further, we assume that the economic gain (in terms of cost Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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reduction) of rationalization increases as the harvest level increases, which means 
that 0 ) , (  h r C h r h h .  
When modeling the growing stock of timber at the end of the year, we assume that timber 
harvest takes place at the beginning of the year. The growth function ) ( 0 h Q g  tells us how large 
a growing timber stock of  ) ( 0 h Q   will become in one year, when it is managed ideally and 
there is no damage or loss due to wildfire or pest outbreak, for example. In other words, 
) ( 0 h Q g  is the maximum stock we will have one year later, if the current timber stock is 
) ( 0 h Q  . We assume that  ) ( 0 h Q g  is an increasing and concave function of  ) ( 0 h Q  , namely, 
0 ) ( ' 0  h Q g  and 0 ) ( ' ' 0  h Q g . 
The function  ) , ( I r S m refers to the percentage of the potential growth that is actually 
realized. Presumably, a larger investment leads to more intensive management of the existing 
stands, which in turn will result in a higher rate of realization of the potential growth. Moreover, 
the marginal effect of increasing management intensity on timber growth usually becomes 
smaller when the management intensity grows higher. Based on these arguments, we assume the 
following properties of the function  ) , ( I r S m :  0 ) , (  I r S m I  and  0 ) , (  I r S m I I .  
In the same way that we model the effect of rationalization on harvest and regeneration 
cost, we include a variable  m r  in the function  ) , ( I r S m  to describe the growth effect of 
rationalization of the management of existing stands. We assume that  0 ) , (  I r S m rm  and 
0 ) , (  I r S m r I m . That is, rationalization of the management of existing stands will increase the 
growth of the stands, but the marginal effect is decreasing as the investment increases.  
The fixed costs of a SOFE here refer to expenditures for retirement pensions and 
employee (including their families) benefits, such as medical care, education, etc. We include 
these costs in the decision model as an exogenous variable because the SOFEs have limited 
means of controlling these costs.  
Substituting equations (1b) and (1c) into objective function (1a), and assuming that an 
interior optimal solution exists, the decision model (1a) to  (1e) can be analyzed as an 
unconstrained optimization problem. At the optimum, the partial derivatives of the objective 
function with respect to the decision variables should be equal to zero. That is:  
1 1 1 1
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0
U Q U Q U Q Q h I hI
h h Q h
   

    
  
    
  
and Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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1 1 1 1
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0
U Q U Q U Q Q h I hI
I I Q I
   

    
  
    
 
Expanding the partial derivatives, and after some simplifications, the first-order 
conditions for the optimal solution can be expressed as:  
00 ( ) ( , )[ ( , )] '( ) ( , ) 0 I m h h m g Q h S r I p C r h g Q h S r I        (2a) 
 
12 ( , ) [ ( , ) ] ( , ) 0 m c n I m S r I ph C r h I c S r I            (2b) 
Equation (2a) implies that if the optimal harvest volume is greater than zero, then the 
marginal profit of harvesting is greater than zero, in other words, [ ( , )] 0 hh p C r h  . Similarly, 
equation (2b) shows that if the investment in forest management I is greater than zero, 
then[ ] 0 fn c     .  
We conducted comparative statics analysis by taking the total derivatives of 
1 ( , )/ U Q h    and 1 ( , )/ U Q I   , respectively, and then equating both the total derivatives to 
zero. It is straightforward to show that  1 ( ( , )/ ) 0 d U Q h      is equivalent to the total derivative 
of the left-hand side of equation (2a) equaling zero. Similarly,  1 ( ( , )/ ) 0 d U Q I      is 
equivalent to the total derivative of the left-hand side of equation (2b) equaling zero. Taking the 
total derivatives of equations (2a) and (2b) yields the following equations: 
0 { ''() () '() ()[ ()]}
() () ()








Adh BdI g S g S p C dQ
g S C dr
S g g p C dr
g S dp



























f n Ir r m




















     ,
  (3b) Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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where: 
  ''() () '() ()[ ()] () () 0 I h hh A g S g S p C g C       
() ()[ ()] '() () 0 II h I B g S p C g S      
2 ()[ ()] 0 Ih C S p C      
1 2 2 ( ) () ( ) () 0 I f n II D S c S             
The signs of A, B, C, and D are determined by the properties of the functions  0 () g Q h  , 
( , ) m S r I , and ( , ) h C r h , and the facts that [ ( , )] 0 hh p C r h   and [ ] 0 fn c     . 
Using equations (3a) and (3b), we can examine the effects of changing each parameter 
1 2 0 ( , , , , , , , ) n h m c p Q r r     on the optimal harvest volume h and forest management investment 
I. Consider, for example, the change of 1  , keeping all the other parameters unchanged. That is, 
1 0 d   and 20 0 n h m d d dc dp dQ dr dr         . Equations (3a) and (3b) reduce to: 
0 Adh BdI   
1 () Cdh DdI S d    



















In a similar way, we can examine the other parameters’ effects on the harvest and 
investment behavior, as well as the effect on the growing stock of timber at the end of the year. 
The results of the comparative statics analysis are summarized in table 4. 











+  +  + 
α1  +  -  - 
α2  -  +  + 
rh  ?  +  ? Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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rm  ?  ?  ? 
πn  -  +  + 
c   +  -  - 
P  ?  +  ? 
 
Based on the results of the theoretical analysis, we can draw the following conclusions. 
    An increase in the initial growing stock of timber causes a SOFE to increase both its 
timber harvest and investment in forest management. The net effect of these changes 
on the growing stock of timber at the end of the year is positive.  
    If the supervising authority increases its emphasis on the financial result of the SOFEs 
in their annual evaluation, the SOFEs will increase timber harvest and reduce 
investment in forest management. Accordingly, the growing stock of timber at the 
end of the year will be smaller.  
If the supervising authority places a greater weight on forest resource 
development, the SOFEs will decrease timber harvest and increase investment in 
forest management, which will results in a larger growing stock of timber at the end 
of the year.  
    Reforms that efficiently reduce harvests and regeneration costs will spur the SOFEs 
to invest more in forest management. The effects of such reforms on timber harvest 
and on the development of the forest resources are undetermined.  
    The impact of reforms—intended to increase the productivity of forest management 
efforts—on timber harvest, investment, and the development of the forest resources 
are undetermined.  
    An increase in non-forestry income will reduce the timber harvest and increase 
investment in forest management. This will result in a larger growing stock of timber 
at the end of the year. In contrast, an increase in fixed costs will increase the timber 
harvest and reduce investment in forest management, and thus result in a smaller 
growing stock of timber at the end of the year. 
o   Following an increase in timber price, the SOFEs will increase investment 
in forest management, but impacts on the harvest and on the development 
of forest resources are ambiguous.  Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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2. Empirical Model Specification 
Based on the results of the theoretical analysis, the econometric models are: 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2 9 ln ln ln ln ln
n
it it it it it it hit mit it it h Q A S T p r r y u                        
2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2 9 ln ln ln ln ln
n
it it it it it it hit mit it it I Q A S T p r r y v                        
1 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2 9 ln ln ln ln ln
n
it it it it it it hit mit it it Q Q A S T p r r y w                        
where 
j
i  (i = 0…9, j = 1, 2, 3) are coefficients; uit, vit, and wit are random error terms; and y is 
time. Definitions of the other variables are presented in table 5.  
Table 5. Definitions of Variables in the Econometric Models 
Variable   Definition   Explanation  
hit  Timber harvest  Total amount of timber harvested by SOFE i in 
year t 
Iit  Fixed assets investment  Fixed assets investment of SOFE  
0
it Q   Growing stock of timber  The growing stock of timber of SOFE i at the 
beginning of year t 
1
it Q   Growing stock of timber  The growing stock of timber of SOFE i at the end 
of year t 
n
it A   Area of non-forestland  The total area of crop land, pastures, and 
diversified land area of SOFE i in year t 
it S   Social burden  The total number of retired employees and staff of 
school and hospital of SOFE i in year t 
it T   Tax and fee burden  Taxes and fees in percentage of the gross 
revenue for SOFE i in year t 
it p   Timber price  Timber price for SOFE i in year t  
h
it r  
Harvest and afforestation 
reform 
Accumulated years since the harvesting and 
afforestation reform started 
m
it r  
Forest protection and 
management reform 
Accumulated years since the forest protection and 
management reform started 
2 
 
Forest protection incentive   Weight of forest resources improvement in the 
annual evaluation of the SOFE  
In the survey data, investment in forest management activities is included in the fixed 
assets investment. Therefore, we use the fixed assets investment of the SOFEs as a proxy for 
total investment in forest management. Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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In the theoretical analysis, we assumed that the SOFE decisionmakers maximize their 
utility, which is a function of current profits and the growing stock of timber at the end of each 
year. In reality, the leadership of each SOFE is responsible to its supervising authority, which 
evaluates the SOFE’s performance, using a number of criteria, including profit and the 
improvement of forest resources.  
The variable ―incentive for forest protection‖ refers to the weight a supervising authority 
assigns in the annual contract to how well a SOFE improves forest resources. Accordingly, an 
increase in the ―incentive for forest protection‖ should reduce the timber harvest and increase the 
investment in forest protection and management, and thus increase the growing stock of timber 
at the end of the year. 
Non-forestland is the combination of agricultural land, pastures, and land used for 
miscellaneous purposes. This variable is used as a proxy for the non-forestry income of the 
SOFEs. According to Xu et al. (2006), the management and utilization of non-timber products by 
the SOFEs promoted the development of this tertiary industry and increased the income of the 
SOFEs and their workers. Furthermore, the management and utilization of non-timber resources 
created jobs and reduced the degree of dependence on forest resources.  
The most important non-timber resource utilizations are crop growing, livestock farming, 
and collecting and processing non-timber forest products, such as mushrooms, fungi, herbs, and 
wild vegetables. Therefore, the area of non-forestland provides a reasonable indication of the 
scale of the non-timber resource utilization. 
In the empirical analysis, we used two variables to describe the fixed costs of the SOFEs. 
The variable ―tax and fees‖ refers to the sum of the taxes and fees a SOFE pays in one year in 
proportion to the gross revenue of the SOFE. The second variable, ―social burden,‖ refers to the 
number of retired workers and school and hospital staff hired by each SOFE.  
The variable ―harvest and afforestation reform‖ refers to the number of years elapsed 
since a SOFE reformed the organization and implementation of its harvest and afforestation 
activities. Similarly, the variable ―forest protection and management reform‖ refers to the 
number of years elapsed since a SOFE reformed the organization and implementation of forest 
protection and management activities. These reforms are important means for the SOFEs to 
increase productivity of timber harvest and afforestation, as well as forest protection efforts. 
Observations of the changes in efficiency resulting from the reforms are not available, however. 
Presumably, it takes time to achieve the maximum effects of the reforms. We use the time Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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elapsed since a SOFE started the reforms as proxy for the extent of rationalization of 
afforestation and forest protection activities.  
3. Data  
We estimated the empirical models with data for all 75 SOFEs in Heilongjiang and Jilin 
Provinces and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (see table 6). The data were collected 
through a survey conducted from June to October in 2005 by Peking University, with the 
assistance of the State Forestry Agency and the three Provincial Forestry Authorities. The data 
include information about forest resources, socioeconomic conditions, timber harvest, and 
investment, as well as the status of forest management reforms from 1980 to 2004. The data 
collected in the survey are complemented by statistics from the State Forestry Agency. 
Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in table 7. 
Table 6. Distribution of the SOFEs in Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces and Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region 
Province  Supervising authority   Number of SOFEs 
Heilongjiang 
Songhuajiang Forestry Administrative Bureau  8 
Mudanjiang Forestry Administrative Bureau  8 
Hejiang Forestry Administrative Bureau  7 
Yichun Forestry Administrative Bureau  16 
Dailing Forestry Administrative Bureau  1 
Jilin 
Jilin Forest Industry Group  8 
Yanbian Forestry Administrative Bureau  10 
Inner Mongolia  Daxinganling Forestry Administrative Bureau  17 
Total    75 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable  Number of 
observations  Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
Total forestland area (1000 hectares)  1,850  198.89  102.86  31.47  588.18 
Growing stock of timber (1000 m
3)  1,850  18541  10498  2082  58700 
Timber harvest (1000 m
3)  1,850  212.39  119.32  5.14  617.90 
Fixed assets investment (million 
yuans) 
1,850  20.24  20.93  0.00  159.79 
Area of non-forestland (hectares)  1,850  8479  10228  0  67011 Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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Social burden (number of persons)  1,850  3715  1752  348  9004 
Tax and fee burden (%)  1,850  26.51  0.091  0.026  0.586 
Timber price (yuan/m
3)  1,850  374.99  96.38  178.55  791.00 
Harvest and afforestation reform  1,850  6.88  7.66  0.00  43.00 
Forest protection and management 
reform 
1,850  0.52  1.70  0.00  21.00 
Forest protection incentive  1,850  0.17  0.04  0.13  0.26 
For all 75 SOFEs, total forestland area increased steadily from 1980 to 2004, while the 
growing stock of timber stayed relatively stable. There are, however, significant differences 
among the SOFEs in different provinces (see figures 1 and 2). On average, the SOFEs in Inner 
Mongolia achieved the most significant increase in both area of forestland and the growing stock 
of timber. Changes in the average forestland area and the growing stock of timber in Jilin 
Province were small. For the SOFEs in Heilongjiang Province, the area of forested land 
increased by about 20 percent, with the major part of the increase occurring in the 1990s; the 
growing stock of timber decreased by more than 20 percent between 1980 and 1989, and has 
been stable thereafter. The average timber stock per hectare was relatively stable in Jilin 
Province and Inner Mongolia (about 130 m3/hectare). For the 40 SOFEs in Heilongjiang 
Province, the average timber stock per hectare decreased significantly from 1980 to 2004.  
Figure 1. Average Area of Forestland Managed by the SOFEs in Heilongjiang and Jilin 
Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
 Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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Figure 2. Average Growing Stock of Timber Managed by the SOFEs in Heilongjiang and 
Jilin Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
 
The timber harvest of the 75 SOFEs included in this study has decreased dramatically 
since the mid-1980s (see figure 3). The average annual harvest volume of the SOFEs in Inner 
Mongolia decreased from 315,000 m
3 in 1986 to 145,000 m
3 in 2004. In Heilongjiang Province, 
the average harvest volume of the SOFEs dropped from 296,000 m
3 in 1986, to 96,000 m
3 in 
2004. The average harvest volume of the SOFEs in Jilin Province decreased from about 297,000 
m
3 in 1986, to 116,000 m
3 in 2004. The primary reasons for the reduction in timber harvest 
during this time were the shift of focus in the national forest policy from timber production to 
nature conservation and environmental protection, and to the lack of mature forests caused by 
decades of unsustainable forest management.  
Figure 3. Average Timber Harvest of the SOFEs in Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces and 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
 Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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Figure 4. Average Fixed Assets Investment of the SOFEs in Heilongjiang and Jilin 
Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
 
 Figure 4 shows that the fixed assets investment in the three provinces increased slightly 
between 1980 and 1998. After the NFPP was launched in 1998, fixed assets investment increased 
rapidly for a few years, but quickly fell back to the 1998 level by 2004. On average, the fixed 
assets investment per hectare of forestland was much higher in Jilin than in Heilongjiang and 
Inner Mongolia, which may have contributed to the relatively high growing stock of timber per 
hectare in Jilin Province. 
In figure 5, we see that the average area of non-forestland of the SOFEs in Jilin Province 
decreased steadily in the 1990s before stabilizing in the early 2000s. For the SOFEs in 
Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia, the average area of non-forestland started to increase in the 
late 1990s, following a significant decrease in the late 1980s. The changes in the area of non-
forestland of the SOFEs were to a large extent the result of changes in policy concerning the 
management and utilization of non-timber resources.  
Figure 5. Average Number of Retired Workers and Social Service Staff of the SOFEs in 
Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
 Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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Figure 6. Average Area of Non-Forestland Managed by the SOFEs in Heilongjiang and 
Jilin Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
 
Since the late 1990s, these SOFEs significantly reduced the number of employees 
through a so-called ―reallocation‖ of surplus staff. At the same time, the number of retired 
workers increased significantly. Figure 6 shows a clear trend where the number of pensioners 
and school and hospital staff increased in the 75 SOFEs. The timber prices were adjusted, using 
the producer price index for forest products, to the 2004 price level. The data show that timber 
prices increased significantly from 1980 to 2004.  
4. Estimation Results  
The sample is a panel data set. In general, panel data can be analyzed using three types of 
models:  pooled regression models, random effects regression models, and fixed effects 
regression models. In our analysis, we first compared the pooled regression model and random 
effects regression model using the F-test. The result showed that the random effects model was 
superior to the pooled model. Next, we used the Hausman test to compare the random effects 
model with fixed effect model, and found that the fixed effects model was more effective. 
Finally, we conducted a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test to the fixed effect model and 
found that we could not reject the correlation assumption among the sample cross-section. 
Therefore, we estimated the models with the feasible generalized least squares considering the 
correlation.  
Because the generalized least squares estimation controlling the heteroskedasticity and 
correlation requires balanced data, we removed one of the SOFEs in Jilin Province, which was 
established in 1990, and estimated the models using 1,850 observations. In order to solve the 
endogeneity problem, we lagged the independent variables, so the actual number of observations 
used in the model estimation was 1,776. The estimation results are presented in table 8. Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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Table 8. Estimation Results 
Independent variable 
Harvest volume  Fixed assets 
investment 
Growing stock of 
timber  
lnh  lnI  lnQ 
Initial growing stock of timber  
0.689***  0.428***  0.985*** 
(79.92)  (15.35)  (320.07) 
Areas of non-forestland 
-0.011***  0.014**  0.001** 
(5.11)  (2.36)  (2.08) 
Social burden 
0.436***  0.076***  -0.006** 
(46.68)  (2.76)  (2.07) 
Tax and fees 
0.854***  -0.218  -0.014 
(17.48)  (1.38)  (0.89) 
Timber price 
0.146***  0.339***  0.004 
(5.85)  (3.88)  (0.65) 
Harvest and afforestation reform 
0.004***  0.004  -0.001*** 
(4.99)  (1.21)  (2.61) 
Forest protection and 
management reform 
-0.019***  0.035***  0.000 
(4.55)  (7.13)  (0.36) 
Forest protection incentive 
-1.646***  8.977***  0.015 
(6.15)  (8.52)  (0.27) 
Time trend 
-0.062***  0.023***  0.002*** 
(42.11)  (3.62)  (5.83) 
Constant 
1.902***  -1.596***  -4.131*** 
(10.75)  (2.78)  (47.26) 
Region dummy variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes:  * indicates significant at 10% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level, and *** indicates significant at 
1% level. Z value is in parentheses. 
The estimation results strongly support the results of the theoretical analysis. The 
empirical results show that an increase in the weight assigned by the supervising authorities to 
forest resource improvement will reduce timber harvest and increase the investment in forest 
protection and management of the SOFE, as the theoretical analysis suggested. The estimation 
also shows that the effects on both the harvest volume and the investment are large. If the weight 
of forest resource improvement increases by 1 percent in a contract signed by the supervising 
authorities and the SOFE, the harvest volume will decrease by 1.65 percent, while the investment 
will increase by 8.98 percent. Increasing the weight of forest resource improvement has a Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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positive effect on change in the growing stock of timber over time, but the effect is not 
statistically significant.  
The forest protection and management reform had a positive impact on investment, but a 
negative influence on the harvest volume. Both effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The reform also had a positive effect on change in the growing stock of timber, but the 
effect is statistically insignificant. The result suggests that the reform focusing on the 
implementation of forest protection activities started to show effects on the harvest and 
investment rather quickly, but it will take longer time before we can observe any significant 
impact of the reform on the development of forest resources over time.  
The afforestation reform had a positive impact on the harvest volume and a negative 
impact on the change in the growing stock of timber. This reform had a positive, but statistically 
insignificant, effect on the fixed assets investment. The result indicates that the afforestation 
reform can effectively reduce regeneration costs. All other things the same, the reduction in 
regeneration costs increases the profits from harvesting and regenerating the forest, and therefore 
causes the harvest level to increase. Intuitively, the afforestation reform should lead to more 
forests being successfully established, which would have a positive effect on the development of 
the growing stock of timber.  
In this study, we regressed the growing stock of timber at the end of each year against the 
growing stock of timber at the beginning of the year, in addition to the other explanatory 
variables. This means that, in our model, forests established in previous years do not affect the 
growing stock of timber at the end of the current year. These forests are accounted for in the 
growing stock of timber at the beginning of the year. Because the growing stock of timber in the 
newly established forests is very low, the positive effect of the regeneration reform on the 
growing stock of timber is negligible. Therefore, in our model, the afforestation reform affects 
the growing stock of timber mainly through its effects on harvest, which explains the negative 
effect of the reform on the development of the growing stock of timber.  
An increase in the social burden of a SOFE will increase its harvest volume and have a 
negative effect on the development of the forest resources. In relation to the theoretical model, an 
increase in the social burden corresponds to an increase in the fixed costs of the SOFE. Thus, 
with respect to the effect on timber harvest and the development of forest resources, the 
empirical result is consistent with the result of the theoretical analysis. What may appear 
surprising is the positive effect of social burden on the fixed assets investment. The reason for 
this positive effect is probably due to the fact that the fixed assets investment included those Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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investments aimed at providing social services, whereas the theoretical model examined the 
effect on investment in forest protection and management. If the social burden increased by 10 
percent, the harvest volume would increase by 4.36 percent; at the same time, the investment 
would increase by 0.76 percent. The effect on the forest resources stock is small.  
As expected, an increase in the tax and fees will significantly increase the harvest 
volume; at the same time, it will affect the investment and the development of the forest resource 
negatively, although the later two effects were statistically not significant. The estimated 
parameters show that a 10 percent increase in the tax and fees will cause a 8.54 percent increase 
of harvest volume. 
An increase in the area of non-forestland would cause the harvest volume to decrease, but 
had a positive effect on the investment and on the development of the forest resources. Since a 
larger area of non-forestland implies a higher non-forestry income, this result is consistent with 
our theoretical result. The effects of the area of non-forestland are small, however. Following a 
10 percent increase in the area of non-forestland, the harvest volume would decrease by 0.11 
percent, the fixed assets investment would increase by 0.14 percent, and the growing stock of 
timber at the end of the year would increase by only 0.01 percent.  
Increases in timber price had positive effects on the harvest volume and the fixed assets 
investment. The estimation result showed that if the timber price rose by 10 percent, the harvest 
volume would increase by 1.46 percent and the fixed assets investment would increase by 3.39 
percent. An increase in timber price would affect the development of the forest resources 
positively, but the effect is statistically not significant.  
The growing stock of timber has significant and positive effects on the harvest volume 
and the fixed assets investment, as well as on the development of the forest resources. If the 
growing stock of timber at the beginning of a year increases by 10 percent, the harvest volume 
and the fixed assets investment in the same year to would increase by 6.89 percent and 4.28 
percent, respectively, and the growing stock of timber at the end of the year would increase by 
9.85 percent.  
5. Conclusions  
An important conclusion we can draw from the results of this study is that a number of 
policy measures can effectively change the managerial behavior, as well as the development of 
forest resources, of the SOFEs. Specifically, the supervising authorities exercise considerable 
influence on the harvest and investment decisions of SOFEs by how they weight specific Environment for Development  Jiang et al. 
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elements in the annual SOFE evaluations. By assigning a greater weight to forest resource 
improvement, the supervising authorities can induce the SOFEs to significantly reduce the 
harvest level and increase investment. Likewise, reduction of taxes and fees, as well as policy 
measures that reduce the social burden of the SOFEs, can significantly reduce the harvest level. 
These measures will have positive effects on the development of forest resources.  
A second conclusion is that the reforms within the SOFEs have had relatively few effects 
on harvest and investment decisions, and on development of the forest resources. The reforms 
have been aimed at increasing the productivity of timber harvest and forest management 
(including afforestation and forest protection) efforts. When carrying out these reforms, the 
SOFEs were not able to make any significant adjustment in the number of employees or the level 
of social services they provide. The potential of rationalization through such reforms is therefore 
limited.  
A third conclusion is that the strategy of promoting non-timber resource businesses (such 
as crop growing, livestock farming, etc.) has had a positive effect on the development of the 
forest resources, although the effect has been small thus far. 
The conclusions are the result of an aggregate analysis of all 75 SOFEs in Heilongjiang 
and Jilin Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and may not be representative of 
these areas individually. Another caveat of the analysis is the fact that the data period ends in 
2004. China is a fast-changing nation, and our conclusions may appear dated. However, most 
SOFEs in China are still highly dependent on forestry income and mature forests available for 
harvesting remain scarce at present. The results of this study can contribute to the continuing 
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